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TRUSTEE LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDER ERISA
MARc GERTNR*
Until 1974, federal regulation of private noninsured pension plans
was minimal and indirect,' but as the scope of these plans underwent
enormous expansion in recent years,2 the need to protect the interest of
employees in employee benefit plans became more apparent, and Con-
gress responded by enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).' Because the unknowns of this legislation cur-
rently far outnumber the knowns, lawyers and other professionals op-
erating in the pension field still are attempting to clarify the changes
created by ERISA. Clearly, though, the expansion of duties and obli-
gations of trustees has increased the risks trustees bear, the possibility of
litigation, the types of redress, and the potential for liability.4 These
changes require fiduciaries of employee benefit plans to take a new look
at trustee liability insurance, more frequently called "errors and omis-
sions insurance." In response to these expanded obligations and liabilities,
this Article will set forth guidelines for use by the fiduciary in procuring
errors and omissions insurance in compliance with section 410 of ERISA.5
Consideration of errors and omissions insurance under ERISA de-
mands a brief review of pre-ERISA trustee liability insurance law for
*A.B., Harvard College, J.D., Ohio State University. Partner, Germer, Barkan &
Robon, Toledo, Ohio.
Author-Appreciation is expressed to Anthony Giomo of the Wittiar AND MARY
LAW REviEw for assistance in editing these materials.
1. Congressional attempts to regulate these plans consisted primarily of awarding tax
benefits to those plans that met minimum standards. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 401(a), 402(a), 404(a), 501(a). The only sanction for failure to comply, however,
was the withdrawal of tax-exempt status. Id. § 503. This shortcoming, coupled with the
utter inadequacy of prior congressional regulatory efforts, made the need for reform
apparent. See Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, Protecting a Potential Pensioner's Pension,-
An Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and
Vesting, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 521 (1974).
2. Estimates of the number of employees covered by such plans range from 23 to 30
million, as compared to 4 million in 1940 and 9.8 million in 1950. It is predicted that by
1980 some 42 million employees will be covered by these plans. Moreover, book value
of plan assets soared from $12.1 billion in 1940 to $150 billion in 1972, and is expected
to reach $225 billion by 1980. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
4. The increasing vulnerability of professional fiduciaries and the need for "errors and
omissions insurance" is examined in Hume, Errors and Omissions Liability as Affecting
Insurance Agents and Brokers, 40 INs. Couss.L J. 379 (1973).
5. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (1975).
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historical and practical perspective. Ten to fifteen years ago this subject
received scant consideration by trustees and their advisors, as only
rarely were legal actions commenced by employee benefit plan partici-
pants or their beneficiaries. Also, very few carriers wrote errors and
omissions policies, and those with available policies made little effort to
market them. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, trustees, in almost
every instance, had wrapped themselves in the secure blanket of a broad-
ly and deftly drawn exculpatory clause.
The five years preceding the enactment of ERISA witnessed in-
creased fiduciary interest in the acquisition of errors and omissions in-
surance. This interest was sparked by the sudden demise of exculpatory
provisions in trust agreements' and an increase in the number of actions
brought by participants and their beneficiaries against trustees.7 Then,
in 1972, Congress gave the first indication of an intent to exert extensive
control over private pension plans with the introduction of the proposed
Retirement Income Security for Employees Act.' This bill severely
limited the availability of protection by exculpatory clauses, causing
trustees to look for other means of protection, principally insurance.
Counsel whose clients asked for an opinion as to the legality of the
purchase of errors and omissions insurance prior to ERISA had two
major concerns. First, the propriety of the purchase of insurance to pro-
tect trusteest from acts of negligence was called into question. If ex-
culpatory clauses were unenforceable because of public policy con-
siderations, the purchase of insurance might be improper for the same
reasons; no primary authority was to be found on point, however.', A
6. New York abolished the shield of exculpatory clauses both by statute, N.Y. EST.,
PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 11-1.7 (McKinney 1967), and case law. In re Lang's Will, 60
Misc. 2d 232, 302 N.Y.S.2d 954. (Sup. Ct. 1969); In re Confort's Estate, 176 Misc. 807,
29 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct. 1941). The courts generally found that only ordinary negli-
gence would fall under the scope of a valid exculpatory clause, and that such clauses
would not excuse gross negligence, which is often equated with willful default. See
Dill v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 343 Mass. 97, 175 N.E.2d 911 (1961). The
criteria of liability are at best uncertain. Compare Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172
N.E. 647 (1930) (fiduciary not liable), witb Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134 Misc.
417, 236 N.Y.S. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (fiduciary liable).
7. See Hume, supra note 4.
8. S. 3598, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (19721. See 118 CONG. REC. 16,904 (1972).
9. S. 3598, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 509 (1972). See 118 CoNG. REC. 16,908 (1972). See
note 68 infra & accompanying text.
10. Most lawyers believed that it was not illegal or improper for the trustees to pur-
chase this protection. Their primary contention was that though both the insurance
policy and the exculpatory clause represent attempts to protect the trustees from the
natural consequences of their own errors, a policy of insurance does not deprive the
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second concern with pre-ERISA trustee liability insurance was the
legality of paying premiums from the trust fund." This question was
most frequently resolved simply by inserting express language in the
trust agreements authorizing the payment of insurance premiums from
the trust fund for the benefit of the trustees.
The passage of ERISA, and in particular of section 410 of the Act,
was intended to remove some of the uncertainty surrounding the pro-
priety of trustee liability insurance. However, though the Act does
regulate the purchase of the insurance and the payment of premiums, it
leaves other questions to be resolved. Much of the consternation sur-
rounding the propriety of trustee liability insurance was occasioned by
the insertion of section 410(b) 12 by the joint conference committee
without any notice or publication.'3 Perhaps the greatest disservice done
by the last miaute insertion of this section and the early effective date of
subtitle B, part 4,14 was to leave the insurance industry without available
ERISA-form policies of trustee liability insurance. There are still only
a few carriers in the field, and they generally were unprepared for the
added provisions of the Act.' At present, therefore, trustees are forced
to take policies not wholly satisfactory; better policies are expected to
be forthcoming soon.
Before discussing the specifics of errors and omissions insurance that
must be considered by the trustees and their advisors, several threshold
matters must be mentioned. Questions arose concerning the propriety
of the use of fund assets by trustees to procure errors and omissions
insurance covering their personal acts. It was feared that purchase of the
insurance would be considered an imprudent expenditure of fund assets,
aggrieved party of a solvent party against whom to seek economic redress for the
damages suffered.
11. Indeed, the two leading trust scholars, George Bogert and Austin Scott, reached
different conclusions on this question. Compare G. BOGERT, LAW OF TausTs, § 126
(5th ed. 1973), with A. SCOTT, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAv OF TRusTs §§ 222.1-.4 (1960).
12. ERISA § 410(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(b) (1975).
13. Compare the provisions of the House bill, H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), see
120 CONG. REc. H1278 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1974), and the original Senate bill, see 120
CONG. REc. S2611 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1974), with the Act as passed following the confer-
ence committee markup, id. at H8163 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1974); id. at S15737 (daily ed.
Aug. 22, 1974).
14. Subtitle B, part 4, took effect January 1, 1975. See ERISA § 414, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1114
(1975).
15. One carrier announced a new policy form and within days after its debut started
proliferating contract amendments. Another well publicized policy was in fact a stand-
ard pre-ERISA policy with several amendatory riders.
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would be condemned as an indirect payment of something of value to
the trustees at the expense of the fund,'6 or would be deemed improper
in light of the required right of recourse by the insurer against the
fiduciaries. 17 Although these problems have been resolved for the pres-
ent, the longterm solutions have yet to be established.'
Of more immediate concern is the status of pre-ERISA policies that
are currently in force. Terminating existing policies would cause the
fund to receive only a short rate refund, and post-ERISA policies con-
stitute more expensive, albeit less concise, replacements.' The pre-
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970) provides that any employee benefit plan trustee who re-
ceives or agrees to receive anything of value because of his position as trustee in return
for acting in a certain manner with regard to the trust shall be guilty of a criminal
offense. See ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (1975) (criminal penalties).
17. The conference committee report accompanying section 410(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1110 (1975), states that plan funds may be used to purchase insurance for fiduciaries
of the plan only if the insurance permits recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary
upon breach of fiduciary responsibility. It should be noted, however, that the
fiduciary himself or his employer or union may purchase the insurance without provid-
ing for recourse. H.R. REP'. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 320-21 (1974).
18. Fortunately, the Department of Labor responded promptly with the March 4,
1975 press release of Assistant Secretary of Labor Paul J. Fasser, including the legal
determination of Solicitor of Labor William J. Kilberg. The last paragraph of the re-
lease, however, gave notice that this may change in the future "as experience data" de-
velop subject to Department of Labor monitoring "of the operation of the policies and
the reasonableness bf premium rates."
19. Trustee advisors who would delay in the purchase of new policies predicate their
action upon two communications of the Department of Labor. First, they cite the fact
that many of the trustees have applied for or received a six-montl stay under regulations
issued by the Department on November 21, 1974. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.414b-1 (1975). How-
ever, these regulations allowed an extension for the provisions of sections 402, 403 (except
(c)), 405 (except (a) and (d)), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1102, 1103, 1105 (1975), through Decem-
ber 31, 1975, and for section 410(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(a) (1975), through June 30, 1975.
Thus, the extension, if granted, defers the effective date of those sections, but does not
stay the requirements of section 410(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(b) (1975). 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.414b-1 (1975).
A second line of defense urged by those seeking to retain the existing liability insur-
ance is based on Department of Labor ERISA Interp. Bull. 75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 39598
(1975). It is argued that the Department granted up to a three-year stay of ERISA if
three conditions precedent were met: (a) the fiduciary services are provided under a
binding contract in effect on July 1, 1974, or pursuant to a renewal of such a contract;
(b) the services provided under the contract are upon terms at least as favorable to the
plan as would be terms of a newly negotiated contract on a freely negotiated transaction
with an unrelated party; and (c) the services were not a prohibited transaction under
section 503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, S 503(b).
This interpretation is incorrect. The ruling attempted to clarify section 414(c) (4)
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (4) (1975), dealing with prohibited transactions. It re-
lated expressly to the effective date of sections 406 and 407(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1106,
107(a) (1975), not section 410(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(b) (1975). The bulletin stated:
[Vol. 17:233
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ERISA policies, however, were not designed to cover the broad range of
liability imposed by the Act, and may fall short of compliance with sec-
tion 410(b). Therefore, though short rate refund losses are as a gen-
eral rule to be avoided and though the currently available trustee liabil-
ity policies that comply with section 410(b) contain inherent uncer-
tainties, a new policy is often the best choice.
This inquiry examines the risks and exposures imposed by ERISA on
trustees of employee benefit plans and the means by which trustees
may structure a policy of liability insurance to protect against those risks.
Although a detailed discussion of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA
and exposure for breaches of this responsibility is beyond the scope of
this Article,20 an understanding of the scope of potential trustee liability
requires an examination of the provisions of ERISA that increase a fidu-
ciary's exposure.
The Act applies to both employee welfare benefit plans2' and em-
ployee benefit pension plans,22 though certain enumerated plans are
beyond the scope of the Act.2 The fiduciary is charged with the estab-
lishment of a plan,24 and must administer plan assets to provide benefits
to the participants and beneficiaries and to defray costs of administration
of the plan. 2 A fiduciary must invest plan assets in conformity with the
prudent man rule 26 and diversify the investments so as to minimize the
"The Department of Labor emphasized that Section 414(c) (4) does not delay the
applicability of any other fiduciary responsibility provisions of Part 4 of Title 1 of the
Act." 40 Fed. Reg. 31598 (1975). See also Department of Labor ERISA Interp. Bull.
75-7, 40 Fed. Reg. 34587 (1975).
20. For thorough treatment of the subject of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA,
see Cheifetz, Fiduciary Standards, Prohibited Transactions, and Diversification of Invest-
ments Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 53 TAxMs 266
(1975); Sporn, Working ,with the New Rules of Fiduciary Responsibility in the 1974
Pension Reform Act, 41 J. TAXATION 263 (1974); Note, Fiduciary Standards and the
Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment Retirenent Income Security Act of 1974,
88 HARv. L. R~v. 960 (1975).
21. ERISA § 3(), 401, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(1), 1101 (1975). These include any
plan that provides medical benefits, accident, disability or unemployment compensation,
vacation benefits, training programs, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.
22. Id. §§ 3(2), 401, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(2), 1101. These include any plans that pro-
vide for retirement income or deferred income.
23. Id. §§ 4(b), 401(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1003(b), 1101 (a) (1).
24. Id. §§ 402, 403, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1102, 1103. See Proposed Dept. of Labor Reg.
§ 2552.1, 40 Fed. Reg. 44456 (1974) (renumbered § 2550.403b-1, 41 Fed. Reg. 20653
(1975)).
25. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (1975).
26. The fiduciary must act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
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risk of large losses.27 A fiduciary may incur liability if he engages in
enumerated prohibited transactions, 8 or if a cofiduciary is guilty of a
breach of trust.2 9 A plan fiduciary who breaches any of the responsibil-
ities, obligations, or duties becomes personally liable to the plan for any
losses resulting from the breach,30 must restore to the plan any profits
made through the use of plan assets, and may be subject to other equit-
able or remedial relief, including removal, deemed appropriate by the
court.31 In addition to being subject to actions for breach of fiduciary
duty, a trustee may face a civil action brought by a participant or bene-
ficiary to recover benefits due under the plan or to enforce a right to
benefits under the plan; further, a participant or beneficiary may seek a
declaratory judgment to clarify rights to future benefits.32
The fiduciary faces additional potential liability as a result of a five-
percent nondeductible excise tax on transactions prohibited by the Act.'"
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims ... ." Id. § 404(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (1) (B). See also S. REP.
No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974).
27. S. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1974); ERISA § 404(a) (1) (C), 29
U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (1) (C) (1975).
28. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106 (1975).
29. Id. § 405, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105.
30. Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a).
31. Id. Section 502 contains civil enforcement procedures for breach of fiduciary
responsibilities imposed by ERISA that may be brought by the Secretary of Labor
or by a participant, a beneficiary, or another fiduciary. Actions of this nature may be
brought only in a federal district court, which has jurisdiction regardless of the amount
of controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Id. §§ 502(e), (f), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132
(e), (f). The Secretary of Labor may commence a civil action to enjoin or obtain
other equitable relief with respect to any act or practice that violates Title I, id. §§ 2
to 514 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 29 U.S.C.A.), and to seek redress for
enforcement of provisions of Title I. Id. § 502(a) (5), 29 U.S..A. § 1132(a) (5).
Uncertain consequences await the fiduciary in the federal courts inasmuch as section
514, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (1975), preempts law as it relates to employee benefit plans
covered by ERISA. Because there currently is no federal common law in this field,
standards to be applied by courts in actions concerning fiduciary responsibilities are
unsettled.
32. ERISA § 502(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (1975).
33. Id. § 2003(a), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(a). A "prohibited transaction" in
the context of section 2003 includes any exchange of property, goods, services, or
facilities between the plan and a disqualified person. Also precluded are the transfer
to, or use of, assets or income of the plan by a disqualified person, and the receipt of
any consideration by any disqualified person from any party dealing with the plan in
connection with a transaction involving the income or assets of the plan. Id. § 2003(c),
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(c). A "disqualified person," defined in section 2003 (a),
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(e) (2), includes fiduciaries and other persons who play
a role in the execution and control of the plan or its assets.
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This tax rises to 100 percent of the amount involved if the transaction is
not corrected within a reasonable time after notice is received from the
Internal Revenue Service that the initial tax is due. 4 A daily penalty of
$100 is imposed for failure to furnish in a timely manner the informa-
tion that the reporting and disclosure provisions of ERISA require
the plan administrator to furnish to a participant or beneficiary upon re-
quest.35 In any action brought under section 502, the courts are granted
discretion to allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs to either party in
an action;36 before the enactment of ERISA, the substantial cost of
maintaining an action against fiduciaries discouraged bringing such a suit.
To insulate himself from these wide ranging liabilities, a trustee may
still procure errors and omissions insurance on the terms set forth in the
Act. Section 410 (b) regulates the purchase of insurance to cover liability
or losses occurring by reason of an act or omission of a fund fiduciary,
providing that such insurance may be purchased by the fund, by the
trustees themselves, or by the participating employers and unions. How-
ever, when the insurance is purchased with fund assets and purports to
protect the trustee for a breach of a fiduciary obligation, the policy must
provide the insurance carrier with a right of recourse.3 7 This require-
ment gives individual fiduciaries very little protection against liability
for a breach of duty under an errors and omissions policy purchased by
34. ERISA § 2003(a), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(b). The time for correcting
the prohibited transaction is referred to as the "correction period," and is defined in
section 2003(f) (6), INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(f) (6). It should be noted that this
section provides that the time may be expanded by the Secretary or his delegate if
expansion is reasonably necessary to bring about the correction of the prohibited trans-
action.
Technical Information Release No. 1329, issued by the Internal Revenue Service on
December 31, 1974, 9 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 6316, clarified the application of the ex-
cise tax to advisor-consultants, whom the Act renders as liable as fiduciaries for
engaging in any of the prohibited transactions. If such services were rendered on a
regular basis on or before June 30, 1974, and the requirements of section 2003 (c) (2) (D),
Irr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4975(c) (2) (D), are otherwise met, the excise tax will not
apply to commissions earned and received prior to July 1, 1977. See Rock, Fiduciary Re-
sponsibility Under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 GA.
ST. B.J. 162, 166 (1975).
35. ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (1975).
36. Id. § 502(g), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g).
37. Id. § 410(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(b) (1). The requirement for recourse under
the subsection is at best ambiguous. The term "recourse" was apparently used to
identify the reservation of a right to the carrier against an insured, as distinguished from
the carrier's right of subrogation against third parties. Section 410(b), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1110(b) (1975), suggests that the right of recourse need only be reserved by the car-
rier against the individual fiduciary who breached the fiduciary obligation and not
against all fiduciaries of the fund.
1975]
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the fund. In response to this requirement, insurance companies have de-
signed a policy aimed at both adequately protecting the fiduciary and
meeting the requirements of ERISA. First, a "basic policy" is purchased
by the fund to cover liability or losses from claims resulting from im-
proper acts or omissions by fiduciaries. Compliance with ERISA re-
quires the basic policy to contain a provision giving the insurance car-
rier the right of recourse against a trustee who breaches a fiduciary duty
and causes a loss covered by the policy. The insurer next offers to the
fiduciaries a "recourse policy" in a separate instrument or a rider at-
tached to the basic policy. Under the recourse policy the carrier either
agrees to protect the fiduciary against any liability arising under the
recourse provision in the basic policy or waives its right against the
fiduciary under the provision. To comply with ERISA, the premium
for the recourse policy canot be paid by the fund, but only by the
trustees individually, by an employer, or by a union2 Combining the
coverages under the basic policy and the recourse policy offers fiduciaries
protection similar to that available prior to the enactment of ERISA.
PROPOSALS FOR ERRORS AND OMISSIONS INSURANCE
In contemplating the purchase of errors and omissions insurance, sev-
eral factors must be considered by the fiduciary or his attorney.
Persons Insured
In addition to the regular trustees and employees of the plan, it is im-
portant that alternate trustees be covered as well. Predecessors and suc-
cessors of the trustees or plan employees should be specifically insured
under the policy.39 The insurance coverage also should protect the
estates, heirs, and personal representatives of these persons. The exten-
sion of coverage to corporate fiduciaries particularly is significant if the
professional administrator or investment manager has a small net worth
in comparison to the total assets administered or managed by the cor-
porate entity.4"
38. ERISA § 410(b) (2), (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 110(b) (2), (3) (1975).
39. If the definition of insured under the policy does not refer to former trustees or
employees, then coverage for claims made against such persons during the policy period
but after they leave office should be discussed with the carrier prior to the purchase of
the policy.
40. For example, an investment manager, other than a bank, may manage $50 million
of assets for various plans while having a net worth of $1 million and an errors and
omissions policy with a $1 million limit. If a plan entrusts that manager with $5 million
[Vol. 17:233
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Because the fund can be sued as an entity,41 the policy should include
the trust fund as an insured under the policy. Benefit-related actions
probably will name the fiduciary and the fund as defendants in the
same suit so as to enable the claimant to obtain relief from the fund if the
fiduciary is exonerated from individual liability.
Insured Risks
Traditionally, fiduciary errors and omissions insurance was considered
to be "all-risk" insurance as distinguished from "named-peril" insurance.
Although under an all-risk policy the carrier will insure all errors and
omissions of insureds except those specifically excluded, named-peril in-
surance covers only those risks enumerated or otherwise specified in the
policy. The type of policy is crucially important in allocating the bur-
den of proof in disputes between the fiduciary and the insurer. Under an
all-risk policy, the carrier must pay unless it can establish the applicabil-
ity of an exclusion.42 If the coverage is named-peril, the insured must
demonstrate that the loss was in fact one of the specific risks covered.13
Several of the policies currently available provide quasi-all-risk coverage
as to all losses resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty.
of. plan assets, it may be prudent for the trustees to insure that there is an errors-and
omissions policy that will cover specifically a claim relating to assets of the plan rather
than relying on the investment manager's policy, which would be responsive to the
claims of all client plans affected by an improper investment decision. Since an invest-
ment manager generally follows the same pattern of investment for all client plans,
an imprudent investment policy could affect all of its client plans, and the net worth
and insurance maintained by the investment manager could be inadequate to cover the
loss fully. It should be noted that carriers are reluctant to add an investment manager
as an insured under the policy.
Most of the policies specifically exclude as insureds any professional administrators
and other professionals and independent entities providing services to the plan. There
are, however, carriers that will include the professional administrator as an insured for
an additional premium.
41. ERISA § 502(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(d) (1975), provides that a fund can be sued
under Title I, id. §§ 2 to 514 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 29 U.S.C.A.), as an
entity; any money judgment against the fund is enforceable only against the fund un-
less the liability of another person, such as a fiduciary, is established in his individual
capacity.
42. American Cas. Co. v. Mitchell, 393 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1968); Dietz v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 305 Ill. App. 507, 27 N.E.2d 540 (1940); Jarvis v. Pennsylvania
Casualty Co., 129 W. Va. 291, 40 S.E.2d 308 (1946). But see Sherman v. Provident Am.
Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1967) (burden is on the plaintiff to negate exclusions
and limitations contained in the policy and pleaded as a defense by the insurer).
43. Betty v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 310 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1962);
Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1965); Glassner
v. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 532, 127 N.W.2d 761 (1964).
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To provide adequate coverage, a policy must anticipate and protect
against acts or omissions most likely to arise during the tenure of the
fiduciary; it not only should insure against losses to the fund incurred
by a direct breach of a fiduciary duty, but also should safeguard acts or
omissions of a fiduciary who acts prudently, but incorrectly.44 Claims
against an insured fiduciary for acts or omissions of noninsured fiduciaries
and other persons for whose acts the insured fiduciary is responsible
should be included in the coverage. If this coverage is not available and
the investment manager is not an insured under the policy, it may be
found that coverage for investment decisions has been diluted substan-
tially.
Defense Costs Covered
Under many of the available policies, the insurer has exclusive control
over litigations against the insured 4' and the correlative duty to defend
the insured in all actions brought against the insured alleging breaches
covered by the policy.4'6 As a corollary to the right of exclusive control,
it should be noted that defense costs incurred by an insured are only
covered by the policy if prior consent is obtained from the carrier.
Under these policies, the carrier retains the right to select the defense
counsel, a choice that the trustees may wish to retain for themselves.
The trustees should determine also the extent of control the carrier in-
tends to exert over the litigation of a claim.47
44. This would include situations in which the trustees take all reasonable steps to
verify eligibility but still make an erroneous benefit payment. A loss results to the fund
notwithstanding the absence of a breach of duty. Other situations in which errors that
would not necessarily constitute a breach of fiduciary duty could occur include counsel-
ing participants regarding their rights under the plan, interpreting the plan, and veri-
fying eligibility and pension credits.
45. Giffels v. Home Ins. Co., 19 Mich. App. 146, 172 N.W.2d 540 (1969); Otteman
v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 172 Neb. 574, 111 N.W.2d 97 (1961). The general purpose
behind such a stipulation, other than giving the insurer complete control over the litiga-
tion, is to prevent any collusion between a claimant and the insured. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942).
46. West v. MacDonald, 103 N.J. Super. 201, 247 A.2d 20 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd,
52 N.J. 536, 247 A.2d 129 (1968). The contractual obligation to defend carries with it
an obligation to prosecute an appeal from a judgment against the insured if reasonable
grounds for such an appeal exist. Ursprung v. Safeco Ins. Co., 497 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.
1973).
47. There are some policies available under which the carrier has no duty to defend,
but the carrier agrees to indemnify the insured for the expenses of litigation incurred
with the prior consent of the carrier. Under this type of policy, the fiduciaries retain




Suits for nonpecuniary relief as well as monetary damages should be
covered. The risk in such suits is not monetary damages but rather the
costs of defense, which could be significant in an action for an injunction
or a declaratory judgment. In evaluating the scope of coverage under
the policy, the trustee should determine whether defense costs in claims
for benefits lawfully paid or payable from the plan are excluded from
coverage, for, if such an exclusion is present, a substantial portion of the
types of nonpecuniary relief provided under section 502 is excluded
from coverage.48 Further, the trustee should ascertain whether coverage
extends to a suit for a declaration of rights concerning pension credit or
other plan provisions that relate to eligibility. If all nonpecuniary relief
suits are excluded from coverage, the extent of coverage for a claim in-
volving both monetary damages and nonpecuniary relief should be
determined.
Application of Deductible
The deductible under the policies is applied to each claim or loss.
Since the deductible becomes a personal liability of the fiduciary if an
alleged breach of fiduciary duty is sustained, it is recommended that it
be kept as low as possible. It should be cautioned, however, that the
payment of an exorbitant premium for a nondeductible policy may be
considered an unreasonable expenditure of plan assets by the Department
of Labor.49
The policy should be studied to determine whether claims or losses
arising out of the same or related acts of one or more insureds will be
considered a single claim or loss for purposes of applying the deductible.
Without such a provision, a suit against a multimember board of trustees
for action taken by the board could impose liability on each trustee for
the full amount of the deductible instead of merely a pro rata portion of
a single deductible. Further, it is important to determine whether the
deductible will be applied to litigation expenses. Several policies specific-
ally provide that the deductible will not apply to the costs and expenses
of litigation covered by the policy. Trustees exonerated of an alleged
wrongdoing would be indemnified against potentially significant defense
costs by a policy that would provide first-dollar coverage in any case
covered by the insurance contract.
48. See notes 31-32 supra & accompanying text.
49. Cf. ERISA S 404(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (1) (1975); note 17 supra.
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Policy Lhnits
Generally, policy limits apply to all claims against the insured during
a policy year; liability in excess of the limit is not covered. When de-
termining the appropriate policy limits, the trustees should consider
especially whether defense costs are covered and whether the policy
covers more than one plan or fiduciary.50
Period of Coverage
The policy should cover all claims filed during the policy period even
though the act or omission giving rise to the claim occurred before cover-
age was purchased. 51 Generally, policies provide for coverage of such
past acts but do not apply if the insured at the inception of the policy
"knew or could reasonably expect" that the act might result in a claim.52
Subrogation Provisions
Errors and omissions policies generally provide that in the event of
payment under the policy, the carrier is subrogated to all of the insureds'
rights of recovery against third persons. It should be assured, however,
that the carrier is not subrogated to any rights of recovery that the
fiduciary may have against the fund itself by virtue of the trust agree-
ment or other provisions.5 3
50. Some carriers permit several plans to be covered under the same policy at a
lower premium than that which would be charged if a separate policy were to be
purchased for each plan. In these cases, the policy limit under such an arrangement
is not applied on a per-plan basis. Therefore, the claims of all the covered plans during
the policy year are aggregated to determine if the limit has been exceeded.
51. The available errors and omissions policies are "claims made" policies under
which the carrier will pay a loss only if the claim against the insured is made during
the policy period. For purposes of determining coverage, the policies consider the time
of the claim, rather than the time of the wrongdoing. An exception to this general
rule is the "claims made extension" provision, which should be included in all policies.
It provides that if the carrier is notified of a potential claim prior to the policy termi-
nation, the claim is to be considered as being made within the policy period despite the
fact that it was actually made after the policy ended.
The standard extended discovery period is 12 months and is generally available only
when the policy is terminated or cancelled by the carrier. If the carrier will agree, an
extended discovery period should also be applicable when the insured terminates the
policy. Generally, the policy will provide a time limitation on the election of this
option, though addition of the extended discovery period option may result in an
additional premium ranging from 25 percent to 30 percent of the cost of the policy.
52. Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Moss, 11 Ill. App. 3d 802, 298 N.E.2d 304 (1973); Matlock
v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P.2d 119 (1941) (workmen's compensation insurance).
53. This situation could arise if the policy extends coverage to acts or omissions





The policy should permit recourse only against an insured fiduciary
to the extent required by section 410(b).-5 If the provision permits
recovery of any payments made under the policy because of any act or
omission by an insured fiduciary, the recourse provision is too broad;
on the other hand, if recourse is permitted only if the fiduciary failed to
act prudently, the provision may be too narrow to comply with the
Act. For example, there could be a breach of a fiduciary duty in which
the prudence of the fiduciary is not in issue, yet section 410(b) would
require the insurance policy to permit recourse against the fiduciary.
After a fiduciary leaves office, the recourse coverage should continue
to protect him against subsequent claims resulting from actions taken
while he was a fiduciary.55 This extended coverage is significant because
the fiduciary may be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty for six years
after a breach occurred, or for three years after the plaintiff had either
actual knowledge or constructive notice of the breach arising from a
report of the breach by the Secretary of Labor.56 In cases of fraud or
concealment, however, the period of jeopardy is six years from either
the violation or its discovery. This potential exposure after a fiduciary
has left office mandates continuation of the recourse coverage for the
insured fiduciary at least until the applicable statutes of limitation have
run.
The recourse policy should provide protection against any payment
or expenditure made by the carrier under the basic policy. Recourse
provisions limiting protection to damages paid by the carrier are not
sufficient since the carrier may be able to proceed against the insured
fiduciary for litigation expenses.
Exclusions from Coverage
All errors and omissions policies contain exclusions from coverage that
substantially limit the types of claims to which the policy is responsive. s
54. ERISA § 401(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(b) (1975).
55. For example, if a trustee resigned and a suit were commenced two years later
attacking a prior action by the trustees, the recourse protection should be applied to
any payments made by the carrier under the basic policy notwithstanding the fact
that the trustee did not renew the recourse policy after the date he resigned as trustee.
56. ERISA § 413(a) (1), (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (a) (1), (2) (1975).
57. Id. § 413(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1113(a).
58. Such exclusions limit the otherwise "all-risk" coverage under the policy. Some
policies, for example, offer coverage for any act or omission by an insured causing a
loss to the fund, though this protection is diluted by an exclusion from coverage of
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In reviewing a policy, it is important to distinguish between an exclusion
applying only to payment of certain damages, such as fines and penalties,
and one disallowing any claim arising from an excluded act. Under the
former type of exclusion, defense costs will be covered and only the
expenses of the specific exclusion will be denied coverage. If the ex-
clusion refers to any claim based on a certain act, then the policy will
not cover defense costs, and the trustees should require the carrier to
assure coverage of defense costs in the event the insured fiduciary is not
held liable for the act.
Although it is impracticable to discuss all possible exclusions in the
context of this Article, several of the more controversial major exclusions
warrant consideration.
1. Fines and Penalties. This exclusion would deny coverage for claims
relating to the $100 daily penalty under section 502(c) 59 for failure
to furnish plan information to a participant or a beneficiary in a timely
manner, the five-percent excise tax on prohibited transactions," and
other penalties imposed by the Act. It is important to ascertain whether
this exclusion would preclude payment by the insurer of compensatory
damages if fines and penalties also are imposed upon the fiduciary, for
if it does, the fiduciary would be well advised either to negotiate for the
inclusion of such protection or to seek insurance from another carrier.
2. Criminal Acts. If the policy contains an exclusion concerning
criminal acts or a willful violation of a criminal statute, this exclusion
should be limited to a conviction involving fraudulent or dishonest in-
tent. Without this limitation, coverage could be denied to a trustee
of the fund who merely accepts contributions from an employer and
fails to set forth a detailed basis for the contributions in a written agree-
ment.0'
3. Willful or Reckless Statutory Violatqons. Several policies exclude
coverage of willful or reckless violations of a statutory duty. Presum-
ably, the term "reckless" is intended to refer to wanton conduct as dis-
any claims for benefits lawfully payable under the plan. If an all-risk policy is modified
by exclusionary clauses, the burden of proof is first upon the insured to show that the
act falls within the scope of the policy coverage; once the insured has done so, the
burden shifts to the carrier to prove that the act is excluded from coverage under the
terms of the exclusionary clauses. See notes 42-43 supra & accompanying text.
59. ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (1975).
60. See notes 33-35 supra & accompanying text.
61. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 302, 29 U.S.C.
§ 186 (1970), as amzended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (Supp. 1975).
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tinguished from simple neglect.' When considering the potential scope
of this exclusion, it should be noted that courts generally apply a stand-
ard that holds fiduciary conduct to be reckless if done arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, or in bad faith.63 The distinction between negligence and will-
ful or reckless misconduct is, however, a nebulous one, and a clarification
of what the carrier means by reckless conduct should be obtained prior
to purchase of a policy containing this exclusion.
4. Discrimination. Some policies specifically exclude claims alleging
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, age, or sex. An increasing
number of cases involve sex and age discrimination under pension plans
on the basis of allegedly discriminatory vesting formulas and retirement
ages. This coverage is particularly significant from the standpoint of
defense costs since courts generally award a successful plaintiff the costs
of maintaining the suit."' It should be determined whether other ex-
clusions under the policy would act to exclude claims based on discrim-
ination. For example, many policies exclude from coverage any prior act
that the fiduciaries, at the time the policy was issued, could reasonably
expect to result in a claim.65 If at the time the policy commenced, the
plan set forth an eligibility rule precluding the payment of benefits for
pregnancy-related disability, a claim arising during the policy period al-
leging that such an eligibility rule violated the guidelines of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission might be excluded. The carrier,
62. The standard measure of the care or diligence required of a trustee is that of
an ordinary prudent man, conducting his private affairs under similar circumstances,
and with a similar object in view. See note 26 supra. Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co.,
144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944); In re Estate of Sullenger, 2
Ariz. App. 326, 408 P.2d 846 (1965); Jarvis v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 478 S.W.2d 266
(Mo. 1972). It should be noted that the courts are very liberal in interpreting this
standard of care, and traditionally have given the trustee the benefit of any doubt. The
ratio decidendi of the rule is that the trustee is not an insurer of the trust property.
Hardy v. Hardy, 217 Ark. 296, 230 S.W.2d 6 (1950), and he cannot be held liable for
mere mistakes or errors of judgment, Bolton v. Stillwagon, 410 Pa. 618, 190 A.2d 105
(1963).
63. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469; 11 N.E.2d 487 (1937), holding that
a trustee cannot be held liable unless he acted in bad faith or failed to exercise sound
discretion.
64. Such costs potentially may include attorney's fees. Cf. Bradley v. School Board,
416 U.S. 696 (1974) (attorney's fees awarded pursuant to statute); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 5 (1973) (recognizing inherent equitable power of federal courts to award at-
torney's fees without statutory authorization); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (attorney's fees may be awarded irre-
spective of defendants' good or bad faith when plaintiff benefits a class and effectuates
a strong congressional policy).
65. See note 52 supra & accompanying text.
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in these circumstances, could argue that at the time the policy com-
menced the trustees reasonably could have anticipated that a claim
would result.
5. Claims for Benefit Payments. The policy should provide coverage
to trustees for defense costs arising from claims for benefits under the
plan, if in the actions the court finds a breach of fiduciary duty and pre-
cludes indemnification by the fund for defense costs incurred by the
trustees. Trustees should be concerned with a blanket exclusion of all
claims for benefits payable under the plan. As noted earlier, 6 a test
based on arbitrary and capricious conduct generally is applied in review-
ing actions by trustees with respect to the payments of benefit claims;
unless there are unequivocal regulations or court decisions holding that
arbitrary and capricious conduct is not a breach of the fiduciary obliga-
tions imposed by ERISA, the policy should provide coverage of such
actions.
6. Dishonesty. The dishonesty exclusion should apply only to fidu-
ciaries on an individual basis, and only when a final adjudication of
active or deliberate dishonesty is made and is material to the claim in
issue. To apply the dishonesty exclusion indiscriminately to the trustees
as a group would negate coverage for a trustee who merely had negli-
gently failed to take proper steps to prevent a dishonest act by a co-
fiduciary.
7. Uninsurable Acts. Any policy excluding acts uninsurable under
law should specifically limit application of the exclusion to acts upon
which a final decision concerning insurability has been made by a court
of competent jurisdiction. The determination should not be left to the
carrier.
8. Misrepresentation and Fraud 'with Respect to the Application for
Insurance or Claim Under the Policy. As a general rule, the insurer can
avoid liability under a policy before a loss is incurred if the insured
procured the policy by fraud or material misrepresentation.> The in-
surance contract should emphasize that misrepresentations by the insured
will not negate the policy unless they are material and intentional. In
66. See note 63 supra & accompanying text.
67. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1969); Stanley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 324 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1959); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Anaya, 78 N.M. 101, 428 P.2d 640 (1967); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Garrett,
31 App. Div. 2d 710, 296 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1968), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 729, 257 N.E.2d 284, 309
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1970) (fraud).
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addition, fraud or misrepresentation by one fiduciary should not in any
way abrogate the protection of the policy as to innocent cofiduciaries.
9. Imputed Acts or Knowledge. The policy should provide that in
applying any exclusion, the wrongful act or knowledge of any one
fiduciary will not be imputed to a cofiduciary for the purpose of deny-
ing coverage to the cofiduciary.
EXCLUPATORY CLAUSES AND INDEMNIFICATION
In considering the alternatives available for the protection of the fidu-
ciary under ERISA, the fiduciary is not limited merely to the purchase
of errors and omissions insurance. The insertion of exculpatory or in-
demnification clauses into the trust agreement can provide broad protec-
tion, and must not be overlooked. Although ERISA provides that any
clause that purports to relieve a fiduciary from any duty imposed upon
him under the Act Shall be void as against public policy,68 two points
should be noted concerning this statutory elimination of the exculpatory
clause protection. First, the Act does not void all exculpatory clauses,
but only those that purport to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or
liability for his fiduciary obligations. Therefore, such clauses are
still valid and effective as to nonfiduciary responsibilities. Secondly, sec-
ton 410 became operative on January 1, 1975 (or July 1, 1975, if a six
month stay was obtained), 69 and any breaches of fiduciary duty com-
mitted prior to those dates still would be protected under exculpatory
clauses then in effect.
Closely related to exculpatory clauses are indemnification agreements,
which provide that if the trust cannot relieve the trustee of liability or
responsibility, someone else-the fund, the employer, or the union-will
agree to hold him harmless for his liabilities. The validity of these pro-
visions has been sustained to a limited degree by the Department of
Labor.70
68. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1110(a) (1975). This does not, however, extend
to agreements among cofiduciaries that allocate specific duties or responsibilities among
themselves. Id. § 405(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105 (b) (1). Nor does it prevent a trustee
from avoiding liability by assigning his investment duties and responsibilities to an in-
vestment manager, id. § 405(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(d), as long as the fiduciary acts
prudently in choosing the manager. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 301
(1974).
69. ERISA §§ 414(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114(a)-(b) (1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1975).
See note 19 supra.
70. Department of Labor ERISA Interp. Bull. 75-4, 40 Fed. Reg. 31599 (1975) provides
in part:
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CoNcLusIoN-A WoRD OF CAu-rIoN
The purchase of trustee errors and omission insurance or the use of
other protective devices by no means will provide absolute insulation
from liability, for there are still many important and, as yet, unresolved
questions concerning the scope of coverage and its limitations. Un-
fortunately, answers to these questions may come painfully to a particu-
lar board of trustees, if the questions are to be resolved by litigation
against the board. Therefore, the purchase of insurance should not lull
a fiduciary into a false sense of security. The most effective protective
device employee benefit plans and their trustees have is an honest, con-
cerned, hard-working board backed up by a well-coordinated team of
competent professionals.
The Department of Labor interprets this section [ERISA 410(a), 29
U.S.C.A. § 1110(a) (1975)] to permit indemnification agreements which do
not relieve a fiduciary of responsibility or liability under Part 4 of Title I.
Indemnification provisions which leave the fiduciary fully responsible and
liable, but merely permit another party to satisfy any liability incurred by
the fiduciary in the same manner as insurance purchased under Section 410
(b) (3), are therefore not void under Section 410(a).
